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Introduction:  
Foxes, Henhouses, and Commissions: 
Assessing the Nonpartisan Model  
in Election Administration, Redistricting, 
and Campaign Finance 
 
Richard L. Hasen* 
On September 14, 2012, the University of California, Irvine School of Law, 
the UC Irvine Law Review, and the University of California, Irvine Center for the 
Study of Democracy sponsored a symposium, “Foxes, Henhouses, and 
Commissions: Assessing the Nonpartisan Model in Election Administration, 
Redistricting, and Campaign Finance,” featuring many of the nation’s leading 
election law scholars. This issue of the UC Irvine Law Review contains scholarship 
presented at that symposium. 
The 2000 Florida debacle marked the first time in which the public focused 
its attention intensely—albeit briefly—on the partisan administration of U.S. 
elections. During the thirty-six days of dispute over who would get Florida’s 
electoral votes and therefore the presidency, it became clear that those running 
key aspects of the election had partisan ties and potentially partisan conflicts of 
interest.1 
Democrats criticized the actions of Florida Secretary of State Katherine 
Harris, the chief election officer of the state, who was not only an elected 
Republican official, but also the honorary cochair of George W. Bush’s 
presidential election committee in Florida. Harris made a number of decisions—
on issues related to timing of the election contest, recount standards, and other 
issues—all of which tended to benefit Republicans. Her decisions cannot be 
 
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, University of California, Irvine School of Law. 
The author thanks Dean Erwin Chemerinsky for his very generous support for the symposium. 
Thanks as well to the UC Irvine Law Review for agreeing to publish the symposium articles and 
commentaries, and to Brittany Rodriguez, Patty Furukawa, Iris Yokoi, Rex Bossert, and the entire 
UCI Law staff for excellent and professional support for the live symposium. This introduction draws 
from the author’s oral remarks at the beginning of the symposium. 
1. For a detailed narrative of the events surrounding the 2000 Florida controversy, see 
RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION 
MELTDOWN 11–40 (2012). The next paragraphs draw from that account. 
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understood as a neutral election official simply applying a strict interpretation of 
Florida’s murky election rules. For example, she adopted a very lax standard for 
acceptance of late-arriving military and overseas ballots, a decision that once again 
benefitted Republicans. 
But while Harris was rightly the focus of Democrats’ ire, she was hardly the 
only partisan involved in the process. Consider Florida Attorney General Bob 
Butterworth, who issued a legal opinion on the timing of Gore’s election protest 
at odds with Harris’s application. Never mind that Butterworth was one of the 
honorary chairs of Gore’s campaign in Florida, and that he had no jurisdiction 
under Florida law over these election matters. 
Then there were local election officials and local canvassing boards. Harris’s 
office had ordered a private company to produce a list of potential felons to be 
removed from voter rolls. Local Republican administrators were much more likely 
than Democrats to use the list to remove felons. Democrats focused on the fact 
that the purge list had many false positives and led to the removal of eligible 
voters who were mistaken for ineligible felons. Republicans noted that many 
ineligible felons ended up voting in Florida’s election—election officials, especially 
Democrats, did not remove them. When it came to recounting ballots, 
Democratic county canvassing boards adopted forgiving and shifting standards for 
recounting punch card ballots—decisions that helped Gore significantly narrow 
his vote gap with Bush. 
All of this brought Florida disputes to the courts, where six Democrats and 
one independent justice on Florida’s Supreme Court issued rulings that helped 
Gore continue his struggle to catch up to Bush, and then to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, dividing five to four along conservative/liberal lines with the Court 
ultimately ending the election contest with Bush ahead and Democrats fuming.2 
In the nearly twelve years since the Florida debacle, states have done little to 
remove partisan election officials from running our elections. A now familiar 
divide between Republican administrators favoring integrity and Democratic 
administrators favoring access quickly emerged. 
Florida did make a change, but arguably to a model that makes the position 
more, rather than less, partisan: the secretary of state now is an appointee of the 
governor rather than an elected official.3 During the 2012 election season, 
Republican Kurt Browning left his position as Florida’s appointed secretary of 
state, and rumor has it he did so because he was not willing to go along with a new 
controversial purge of potential noncitizen voters.4 No problem: Florida governor 
 
2. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). 
3. John M. Glionna, Key States’ Ballot Officials Feel Glare of Critical Eyes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 
2004, at A1. 
4. Marc Caputo, Florida’s Noncitizen Voter Purge Grew from Five-Minute Conversation, MIAMI 
HERALD (Jun. 13, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/13/2847062/floridas-noncitizen 
-voter-purge.html. 
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Rick Scott appointed a new Republican secretary of state who did not have such 
worries. 
In Ohio, one of the most contested of battleground states, the last two 
secretaries of state, Republican Ken Blackwell and Democrat Jennifer Brunner, 
have made controversial decisions that seem to benefit their respective political 
parties.5 Current Secretary of State Jon Husted at first appeared to try to move 
above the partisan fray,6 but Democrats later accused him of favoring his party’s 
positions in elections.7 We went into yet another election season concerned that 
the referees are not neutral. 
While there has been virtually no movement toward nonpartisan or 
bipartisan models when it comes to election administration, things are different on 
the redistricting front. Most prominently, California recently completed its first 
round in process of redistricting done by a citizen commission whose members 
were chosen through a Rube Goldberg-esque process set forth in a California 
initiative.8 Ironically, Republicans touted the model as a way to take redistricting 
decisions away from the Democratic-led partisan legislature. Republicans joined 
with good government groups, including Common Cause, to bypass the 
Democratic legislature and get the measure approved as a voter initiative. But after 
the first round of redistricting, Republicans blasted the results in California as 
being manipulated by Democrats on the Commission.9 Republicans ultimately 
abandoned court challenges and a referendum, and California recently conducted 
its first elections using the new maps. 
Partisan fights over citizen redistricting were even worse in Arizona, where 
the Republican governor sought to remove the head of the independent 
redistricting commission as being biased toward Democrats, only to have the state 
Supreme Court block the removal.10 
Meanwhile, in the campaign finance arena, the Federal Election 
Commission’s (FEC’s) bipartisan model of governance—no more than three 
 
5. See HASEN, supra note 1, at 105–30. 
6. Id. at 122–23. 
7. Edward B. Foley, Virtue over Party: Samuel Randall’s Electoral Heroism and Its Continuing 
Importance, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 475, 476 n.6 (2013); Voting Upgrades Needed: This Year's Election Was 
Marred by Challenges, Confusion and Occasional Long Lines of People Waiting to Exercise their American Duty. 
Let's Fix the Problems, Now, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 17, 2012, at G1. 
8. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8251–53 (West 2013). 
9. John Myers, The Frenzy Over ProPublica’s Redistricting Reports, KQED (Dec. 21, 2011, 10:30 
PM), http://blogs.kqed.org/capitalnotes/2011/12/21/the-frenzy-over-propublicas-redistricting-report; 
Olga Pierce & Jeff Larson, How Democrats Fooled California’s Redistricting Commission, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 
21, 2011, 3:38 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-democrats-fooled-californias-redistricting 
-commission. 
10. For the history of these commissions, see Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better 
Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808 (2012); Peter Miller & Bernard Grofman, Redistricting Commissions 
in the Western United States, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 637 (2013); see also Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n v. Brewer, 275 P.3d 1267. 1268–70 (Ariz. 2012). 
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members from one party may serve on the Commission,11 with the practical effect 
being three Democrats and three Republicans serving on the Commission—
seemed to work reasonably well for many years but in more recent years has led to 
party stalemates on important issues. The three-to-three deadlocks have rendered 
the FEC much less powerful than it was before the rise of deadlocks, leading 
reformers to call for a change from the bipartisan model. This movement appears 
to have support from neither Republicans nor Democrats in Congress, and 
President Obama has not followed through on his calls to reform the FEC.12 
As the live symposium began in September, I raised a cluster of unanswered 
questions about bipartisan and nonpartisan models: 
1. Is nonpartisanship in administering elections possible? What do we mean 
by nonpartisanship? Are there different models of nonpartisanship to choose 
from? 
2. Is nonpartisanship desirable? How does it compare to bipartisan and 
partisan models on questions of accountability, accuracy, and public acceptance? 
3. What can we learn from the experiences of individual states and of other 
countries, and how much does our historical experience of hyperfederalized 
administration block change? Are there cultural issues that differentiate us from 
other mature democracies using nonpartisan models? 
4. Are there differences in opinion as to whether nonpartisanship is a 
desirable and/or achievable model when comparing election administration, 
redistricting, and campaign finance? 
5. What explains whether commissions are successes or failures? How did 
the FEC move from bipartisan cooperation to confrontation? 
6. What role do courts play in these disputes? Do courts count as 
nonpartisan institutions? Should there be specially constituted courts to adjudicate 
election-related disputes? 
The articles in this symposium take us in the right direction to begin 
addressing these crucial yet difficult issues. The articles cover three areas: election 
administration, redistricting, and campaign finance. 
In his symposium keynote address,13 Professor Ned Foley considered 
whether a move to nonpartisan election administration is enough to solve the 
problem of partisanship in elections, given the continued control over portions of 
the electoral process by partisan legislative and executive branches.14 In his article, 
Foley argues that, in some circumstances, fairness in dealing with election 
controversies requires that partisan decision makers act with virtue, putting the 
 
11. 2 U.S.C. § 437c (2012). 
12. Kim Geiger, Obama Is Urged to Take Action on Moribund FEC, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2011, at 
A16. 
13. Foley, supra note 7. 
14. Id. at 477–81. 
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interests of the nation (and fairness in election administration) over self-interest 
and party interests.15 He explains the virtue concept through an examination of 
the role Speaker of the House Samuel Randall played during the disputed Hayes-
Tilden presidential election of 1876. Foley characterizes Randall as a hero. 
Other symposium articles delve into different aspects of measuring fairness 
and partisanship in election administration. Chris Elmendorf and Doug Spencer 
examine whether the California attorney general, who is responsible for drafting 
the ballot title and summary for statewide ballot measures, drafts ballot language 
in an impartial or biased way.16 Using experiments with students, the authors find 
little evidence to support the idea that attorneys general manipulate the complexity 
of ballot measure language for strategic benefit. The authors leave open the 
possibility that attorneys general are biased in other ways, particularly on a very 
small number of extremely controversial measures. 
David Kimball, Martha Kropf, Donald Moynihan, Carol Silva, and Brady 
Baybeck examine the views of local election administrators toward election 
administration issues.17 Using survey data, the authors find that partisan 
differences in election administration (such as attitudes about the desirability of 
strict voter identification laws for voting) occur mainly in large electoral 
jurisdictions but not in smaller jurisdictions. However, the authors find that local 
election administrators’ evaluations of state and local election administration are 
influenced more by outside forces than by the party affiliation of election officials. 
They are pessimistic that these outside forces in the voting wars will subside any 
time soon. 
Bringing this first section on nonpartisan election administration to a close, 
Dan Tokaji examines the workings of the Wisconsin Government Accountability 
Board (GAB), the only statewide nonpartisan election administration body in the 
United States.18 After explaining the origins of the GAB, Tokaji concludes that the 
body has been successful in administering elections fairly in its first five years, and 
that it serves as a worthy model for other states considering an alternative to 
partisan administration of elections. The GAB’s performance is especially 
noteworthy, Tokaji argues, given the intense partisan atmosphere of Wisconsin 
politics in the last few years. 
Symposium participants also considered the role of redistricting 
commissions. Karin Mac Donald and Bruce Cain look in depth at California’s new 
independent redistricting commission, and particularly consider how the new 
 
15. Id. 
16. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Are Ballot Titles Biased? Partisanship in 
California’s Supervision of Direct Democracy, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 511 (2013). 
17. David C. Kimball et al., The Policy Views of Partisan Election Officials, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
551 (2013). 
18. Daniel P. Tokaji, America’s Top Model: The Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, 3 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 575 (2013). 
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commission worked with public testimony and other data to craft new legislative 
districts.19 The authors consider the importance of qualitative data on 
communities of interest, rejecting a wholly objective approach to this issue. They 
conclude with an examination of the tradeoffs that redistricting officials must 
make between the goal of preserving communities of interest and achieving other 
goals, such as the creation of competitive districts. 
Although Mac Donald and Cain focus exclusively on California, Peter Miller 
and Bernie Grofman look more broadly at redistricting commissions in the 
western United States.20 The authors find that redistricting commissions are more 
common in the West, in part thanks to the availability of direct democracy to 
implement the organizational form. Perhaps surprisingly, Miller and Grofman find 
only very limited evidence that commissions are better able than legislatures to 
produce compact, competitive districts that respect the boundaries of counties 
and places in the states. They also find considerable variation across states and 
across types of commissions. 
Nicholas Stephanopoulos also looks at redistricting criteria and institutional 
design through an even broader comparative lens that includes parts of Australia 
along with certain U.S. states.21 Stephanopoulos concludes that jurisdictions that 
have adopted consequentialist criteria for districting—in particular aiming for 
district plans that promote partisan fairness or maximize competitiveness of 
elections—do not do a good job in achieving those goals. However, independent 
commissions have done a better job in assuring partisan fairness and 
competitiveness of district elections. He concludes that “[i]ronically . . . 
consequentialist criteria cannot achieve their own desired consequences—but that 
non-consequentialist approaches can.”22 
Symposium participants also considered the role of partisanship in 
institutions charged with administering or policing compliance with campaign 
finance laws. Kayla Crider and Jeffrey Milyo examine whether state ethics 
commissions reduce political corruption.23 Using statistical analysis, the authors 
find no strong or consistent support for the claim that state ethics commissions 
reduce political corruption. Nor do the authors find any evidence that the form of 
the commission—partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan—makes any difference in 
the efficacy of the commissions. On the whole, Crider and Milyo are skeptical 
about the entire ethics commission enterprise. 
 
19. Karin Mac Donald & Bruce E. Cain, Community of Interest Methodology and Public Testimony, 3 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 609 (2013). 
20. Miller & Grofman, supra note 10. 
21. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Consequentialist Criteria, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 669 (2013). 
22. Id. at 708. 
23. Kayla Crider & Jeffrey Milyo, Do State Ethics Commissions Reduce Political Corruption? An 
Exploratory Investigation, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 717 (2013). 
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In the final symposium article, Michael Franz examines the role of the 
Federal Election Commission, a six-member commission that has been comprised 
with equal numbers of Democratic and Republican commissioners since its 
inception.24 Franz examines the set of advisory opinion requests submitted to the 
FEC from 1977 to 2012. He finds that, for a number of decades, the FEC 
Commissioners commonly came to consensus when they interpreted the law. In 
recent years, however, deadlock has become more common, and as a 
consequence, the FEC has more frequently been unable to offer clear advice to 
those requesting advisory opinions. 
Together, these nine articles advance our understanding of the promises, 
pitfalls, and remaining questions about the use of nonpartisan and bipartisan 
institutions to regulate different aspects of the political process. The articles show 
that nonpartisanship is no panacea to many of the problems plaguing our political 
system. Still, there is hope that new and reimagined institutions can improve the 
electoral process, governance, and ultimately the integrity of the political system 
and the responsiveness of elected officials to the voters and the people. The work 
in this area has just begun. 
  
 
24. Michael M. Franz, The Federal Election Commission as Regulator: The Changing Evaluations of 
Advisory Opinions, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 735, 739 n.19 (2013). 
